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Abstract: This article takes up Todd Shepard’s call to “write together the history of the 
Algerian War and European integration” by examining the French Socialist Party. Socialist 
internationalism, built around an analysis of European history, abhorred nationalism and 
exalted supranational organization. Its principles were durable and firm. Socialist visions for 
French colonies, on the other hand, were fluid. The asymmetry of the party’s European and 
colonial visions encouraged socialist leaders to apply their European doctrine to France’s 
colonies during the Algerian War. The war split socialists who favored the European 
communities into multiple parties, in which they cooperated with allies who did not support 
European integration. French socialist internationalism became a casualty of the Algerian 
War. In the decolonization of the French Socialist Party, support for European integration 
declined and internationalism largely vanished as a guiding principle of French socialism. 
 
Cet article adresse l’appel de Todd Shepard à «écrire à la fois l’histoire de la guerre d’Algérie 
et l’histoire de l'intégration européenne» en examinant le Parti socialiste. L’internationalisme 
socialiste, basé sur une analyse de l’histoire européenne, dénonça le nationalisme et exalta le 
supranationalisme. Ces principes furent durables et fermes. Par contre, sa politique pour les 
colonies fut fluide. L’asymétrie entre les visions européenne et coloniale du parti encouragea 
l’application de la doctrine européenne aux colonies françaises pendant la guerre d’Algérie. 
La guerre divisa les partisans socialistes des communautés européennes en multiples partis, 
dans lesquels ils coopérèrent avec des alliés qui ne soutenaient pas l’intégration européenne. 
L’internationalisme socialiste français fut une victime de la guerre d’Algérie. Dans la 
décolonisation du socialisme français, le soutien pour l’intégration européenne recula et 
l’internationalisme disparut comme principe directeur. 
 
The Algerian War, European Integration, and the Decolonization of French Socialism 
 
On the eve of the Battle of Algiers, a French counter-insurgency that marked a violent peak in 
the Algerian war for independence, French premier Guy Mollet told a reporter that his 





 In making the case for keeping Algeria French, Mollet, a socialist, put forth 
internationalist principles that had a long history within the French Socialist Party, the full 
name of which was the Socialist Party-French Section of the Workers International (SFIO). 
Conceived within the party as a remedy to European nationalism and militarism in the early 
twentieth century, these principles held that nationalism was a danger to peace and national 
sovereignty anachronistic in a world of increasing economic interdependence. The remedy 
was to build supranational organizations to govern the economic and political relations 
between states within a world, or European, federation. A powerful and salient discourse, 
internationalism was the core of the party’s foreign policy after the Second World War.  
At the same time that Mollet oversaw an enormous escalation in the French military 
campaign against the Algerian revolution in 1956-57, his government negotiated the Treaties 
of Rome to create a European Economic Community (EEC), a six-nation European common 
market that later became the European Union (EU). Though they were contemporary events, 
the Algerian War and the early years of European integration have largely been studied in 
isolation from one another. That has begun to change in recent years with a flurry of 
publications about “Eurafrica.”
2
 This idea, which took many forms, was widely debated in the 
interwar period and appeared for a brief period in the 1950s as an innovative way of fusing 
European integration with evolving projects of federation between France and its (supposedly 
former) colonies. In addition to these works, Frederick Cooper’s recent and influential book 
on citizenship and empire rejects a telos engrained in most studies of decolonization.
3
 Instead 
of considering the independence of French colonies as inevitable, he emphasizes contingency, 
multiple possibilities, and African support for federal projects in his study of the postwar 
French Union, which replaced the French Empire in 1946. Todd Shepard, for his part, 
encourages scholars to think of the postwar period as a “time of ‘great ensembles,’” when not 
only supporters of European integration questioned the progressive nature of the nation-state, 
but so too did Algerian revolutionaries seeking independence.
4
 In considering why the 
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Socialist Party found it so hard to let go of Algeria, it is important to restore the contemporary 
sense of desperation caused by colonial war, but also of possibility and excitement offered by 
supranational federation. This article takes up Shepard’s call for scholars to “write together 
the history of the Algerian War and European integration after 1945” by analyzing how 
internationalist principles on Europe affected socialist discussions of Algeria. In turn, it 
contributes to an emerging literature about decolonization’s impact on French politics and 
society by demonstrating how the Algerian War helped transform and marginalize 
internationalism within French socialism in the 1960s.
5
  
Colonial and European concepts of international organization and integration, 
sovereignty and supranationalism, federation and confederation, intersected within the SFIO 
as it discussed Algeria and the EEC in 1956-57. They did not, though, intersect on equal 
terms. Socialist internationalist discourses, built around an analysis of European history, 
cemented into doctrines that proved remarkably durable. The weakness and fluidity of its 
vision for French colonies, on the other hand, encouraged a bleeding of the former discourse 
into the latter as a means for French socialists to cope with, shape, and forestall 
decolonization. It was not that internationalist discourses took over (or “colonized”) colonial 
discourses, which were a discursive stream with many tributaries. Remnants of the “civilizing 
mission,” evolutionary hierarchies, and anti-Islamic and racist mindsets shaped socialist 
thinking, as did traditions of “humanitarian colonialism” and what Martin Evans calls “third-
way reformism.”
6
 Rather, socialist discourses on European integration resonated so greatly 
within the party that, as socialist leaders contemplated how to reconcile the “European” and 
“Muslim” populations of Algeria, these internationalist principles were on hand and already at 
the forefront of their minds. Pulled in different directions, unsure about their desired end goal 
for Algeria, and increasingly uneasy about the escalating repression in Algeria, European 
integration was an anchor in stormy seas, a light in the deepening darkness, a purifying cure 
to the intractable conflicts of the “dirty war.” Agonizing over designs for federation or 
confederation between France and Algeria, the government’s success in Europe was a 
seductive, almost irresistible frame of reference. As opposition grew within the party, socialist 
leaders sought refuge in SFIO internationalist principles, which had their genesis in analyses 
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of Europe rather than of empire. In doing so, they displayed a striking inability (or 
unwillingness) to conceptualize the colonies on their own terms.  
Historians of the French left, colonialism, and decolonization to date have not 
investigated how socialist colonial visions interacted with the party’s internationalist 
principles on sovereignty and European cooperation.
7
 Though existing studies emphasize the 
damage the war wreaked on the party, they overlook how it, within a decade, also contributed 
to undermining support for European integration. Talbot Imlay writes that the war 
“discredit[ed] minority rights among European socialists,” because Mollet’s insistence that 
the protection of European settlers in Algeria had “precedence over national rights” 
embarrassed socialists eager to collaborate with the non-aligned movement then emerging in 
Asia and in Africa.
8
 The war also discredited socialist internationalism in the eyes of an 
emerging political and cultural force, the “New Left,” which never forgave the SFIO for its 
role in the war. This article demonstrates how the dynamics unleashed by the war 
reverberated back onto the French Socialist Party. The war split socialist advocates of 
European integration into multiple parties, in which they cooperated with allies who did not 
share their conception of internationalism. Moreover, European integration did not resonate in 
the same way to socialists who came of age during the Algerian War. Attracted to the project 
of Third World state-building, they also looked to the nation-state at home for solutions to 
domestic problems. When the fractured left came together into the new Parti socialiste in 
1969-1972, only a rump, elderly faction remained to defend the socialist internationalist 
principles that had shortly before been an indispensable feature of what it meant to be a 
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The Genesis of French Socialist Internationalism: Supranationalism, a United States of 
Europe, and Colonization without Colonialism  
 
Internationalism was a unifying concept that distinguished socialists within the French 
political arena. Before the First World War, the concept was rather vague, another rhetorical 
arrow in the socialist arsenal to threaten a revolution the party was not preparing to actually 
launch. Its content was twofold: a rejection of nationalism and militarism, and solidarity with 
other socialist parties in the Second International. Marxism, often condensed to the famous 
line “Workers of the world unite,” gave inspiration, if not always substance, to the 
consolidation of internationalism as a binding agent of French socialism. Jean Jaurès, the 
socialist leader martyred by an assassin’s bullet on the eve of the First World War, provided 
the SFIO with a dictum that internationalism was a higher form of patriotism, asserting in 
1911 that, “A little patriotism leads away from the International; a lot of patriotism leads back 
to it.”
9
 Repeated ad nauseum by socialists in the first sixty years of the twentieth century, it 
was at once a comforting cliché for party militants and a discursive imperative for party 
leaders, who explained their policies within the legitimizing language of Jauressian 
internationalism.  
French socialist internationalism before the war had little to say about France’s 
colonies. Born of a language of proletarian revolution, French socialists (rather justly) read 
Marxist internationalism to mean solidarity of the most “advanced” industrial working 
classes, the workers of Europe and, by extension, of the socialist parties that arose to lead 
them. The concept did not offer a course of action for Europe’s colonies. The party wavered 
on the colonial question. At the 1895 congress of the Parti Ouvrier Français (POF), the party 
unambiguously denounced colonial expansion, opposed expeditions to Indochina, and 
condemned repression in Madagascar. Despite this record, POF opposition to the colonialism 
of the French Third Republic generally did not focus on colonial peoples. Rather, French 
socialists argued that the colonies sapped wealth from French workers. On the other hand, 
socialists in Marseilles, a port city dependent on trade with Africa, argued in favor of French 
colonial expansion as a means of raising workers’ living standards.
10
 Jaurès at first voted for 
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colonial expeditions in the 1880s before rallying to the POF’s stance in 1896. He adopted an 
assimilationist position and supported French citizenship for Algerian Muslims.
11
  
In the first decade of the twentieth century, French socialist discourses on the colonies 
began to shift. When Paul Louis published Le Colonialisme in 1905, the same year socialists 
united to form the SFIO, he popularized the term “colonialism” in France, out of which 
sprang the term “anti-colonialists” committed, naturally, to “anti-colonialism.”
12
  The SFIO 
party congress followed up on Louis’s critique by asserting that “socialism is intrinsically 
hostile to colonialism, which relies on violent conquest and…the suppression of Asian and 
African peoples.” Many socialists, however, opposed this stance and the party placed greater 
emphasis on the benefits of French colonization in the years before the First World War.
13
 
Morin writes that there existed three trends of thought in the SFIO at the time: “a rigorous 
anti-colonialist trend, an indulgent trend favorable to colonization, and a more balanced 
position expressed by Jaurès that wished to combine an extension of progress and democracy 
with respect for indigenous populations.”
14
 Still, the most common reaction within the party 
to the colonial project remained, according to Morin, “indifference.”  
French socialists were fixated, though, on preventing colonial disputes between the 
major European powers from spiraling into a European war. They appropriated ideas about 
international organization rooted in liberal internationalism and pacifism and applied these 
international “solutions” to the colonial question.
15
 Colonies were objects, rarely subjects, of 
these discussions. By 1912 Jaurès and others were calling for an “internationalization” of 
European colonies and a sharing of colonial riches as the basis for a European entente.
16
 After 
the First World War broke out, French socialists supported the creation of a League of 
Nations with a wide range of powers to guarantee conditions for peaceful cooperation 
between states. They were disappointed by the League established during the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919-1920 because it lacked a “supranational authority” to enforce its 
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 The SFIO press called for a “Federal and Socialist Republic of the United States 
of Europe” that would also resolve the colonial question.
18
 At an international socialist 
conference in Bern in 1919, a SFIO representative said that it “would be terrible to deprive 
Germany” of its colonies as part of the postwar peace settlement. Rather, “internationalization 
[should] be extended to the other colonies…and Germany [should] have, within the League of 
Nations, its share in the administration of the…internationalized colonies.”
19
 This was also 
the view of Léon Jouhaux, head of the formally independent yet SFIO-aligned trade union 
federation, the Confédération générale du travail (CGT), who called in 1918 for the 
“internationalization of the colonial domain for a better use of the surface and underground 
resources, for the well-being of humanity, and for the moral and material uplifting of 
indigenous peoples.”
20
 When the League of Nations approved French and British mandates 
over areas of Africa and the Middle East, French Socialists called for these to be managed 
internationally by the League.
21
 
For French socialists, colonial policy remained subordinated to their goal of 
“international,” i.e., European, cooperation through the interwar period. SFIO leader Léon 
Blum consistently called for strong supranational and regional institutions to resolve 
international disputes as well as domestic economic problems.
22
 In 1926, SFIO delegates 
succeeded in convincing their Belgian and German socialist colleagues to support a European 
customs union, an idea at the heart of the European Economic Community established several 
decades later. The conference’s joint resolution claimed that a customs union was necessary 
due to “the interdependence and economic interpenetration of nations.”
23
 This thinking came 
out as well in discussions of colonial matters. Jean Zyromski, leader of a leftist faction in the 
SFIO, called for an “internationalization of colonial policy [as a step towards] an international 
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economic development of the market” at the 1927 party congress.
24
 Achieving French-
German reconciliation through a colonial entente, sometimes known as “Eurafrica,” was a 
constant temptation for French socialists. The enticing prospect informed the economic 
agreements concluded by Blum’s Popular Front government with Adolf Hitler’s government 
in 1937, which granted Nazi Germany most-favored-nation trading status in French colonies 
and mandates.
25
 André Philip, SFIO economist and the foremost advocate for European 
integration after WWII, supported offering Italy and Germany joint international mandates 
over their former African colonies as late as 1937.
26
  
Apart from its consistent support for an internationalization of European colonies, SFIO 
policies for French colonies were in flux through the interwar period. In 1919, the socialist 
press supported independence for Tunisia. At the 1920 Tours congress, adherents of socialist 
internationalism split from those who supported Bolshevik internationalism. At the congress, 
Blum’s motion distinguished between “colonialism” and “colonization” and refused to 
“confuse the revolt of oppressed peoples with the work of proletarian revolution…
27
 The 
approved motion, however, recognized the colonial peoples’ “right to decide for themselves,” 
except, importantly, “by means of war.” In 1925, a French radical-led government sent 
soldiers to fight a Moroccan national movement in a conflict known as the Rif War. The SFIO 
at first abstained and then approved the government’s policy, before withdrawing support 
later that year. The SFIO rejected “nationalism” in the colonies as in Europe during the Rif 
War, a precedent for its response to the Algerian revolution.
28
 In justifying the party’s initial 
position, Blum spoke of the “duty of superior races to bring the same degree of culture to 
those who have not succeeded in achieving it.”
29
 French socialists were also influenced by an 
interwar shift towards “humanitarian sensibilities regarding colonialism” in French literature, 
the press, and in international organizations like the League of Nations and the International 
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 They believed in the “civilizing mission” of the French republic, 
emphasizing in particular improvements in hygiene, living standards, economic 
modernization and, as in France, the civilizing potential of schools.
31
  
Marius Moutet, the SFIO’s leading colonial expert, denounced the chasm between 
France’s “civilizing mission” and the colonial reality, but he too favored an “altruistic 
colonization.”
32
 Given the party’s fervent secularism, in the Jacobin tradition, Islam appeared 
fanatical and anti-modern. French administrators, like their French revolutionary antecedents, 
must overthrow the “feudalism” of rural traditional elites. Eager to retain their large 
constituency among the mostly French and Italian settlers in Algeria, known as the 
“European” population, socialists grafted class struggle onto Algeria, clumping together the 
tyranny of indigenous elites with European capitalism.  In 1927, Blum called for a larger 
representation of colonial peoples in the French parliament and stated that “We want colonial 
legislation to lead towards independence, towards self-government, like the [British] 
dominions.”
33
 Soon, however, independence disappeared from official socialist discourses 
and assimilation became the party’s official policy. It was this assimilationist platform, a mix 
of political and economic reforms as a stage towards equality with Europeans, that the 
Popular Front government offered Algerian Muslims when Blum became Prime Minister in 
1936.  
Moutet, Colonial Minister under Blum, announced the Popular Front’s intention to 
implement a reformist program that included an end to forced labor. The Blum-Violette 
proposal offered citizenship to a limited number of Muslim Algerians and proposed a single 
electoral college of Europeans and Muslims. In response, the Algiers Muslim Congress led by 
Ferhat Abbas published a manifesto favoring assimilation with France but, crucially, it was 
rejected by Messali Hadj’s nationalist movement, L’Étoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), which 
demanded independence. Socialists had long had frosty relations with Hadj. Failing to 
appreciate the enormity of violence embedded within the daily practice of French colonial 
rule, they accused Hadj of fomenting a race war. They asserted instead their vanguard theory 
that “the emancipation of the workers of the capitalist countries will give the signal to the 
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emancipation of colonial countries” and their evolutionary view that “The objective of 
socialist action is the emancipation of individuals by the progressive adoption of the practices 
of democracy and by enlightenment diffused through schools, and not the emancipation of 
colonized peoples considered as specific collectivities entitled to independence.”
34
 Settlers 
responded to the Blum-Violette proposal by mounting a fierce resistance and, beleaguered by 
a range of domestic, coalitional, and international problems, the reform program for Algeria 
emerged stillborn in 1937.  
The failure of the Popular Front’s assimilationist program and its renewed oppression of 
nationalist movements in 1937-38 alienated moderate Algerians from the French left and 
opened the door for the more assertive nationalist movement that emerged after the Second 
World War.
35
 Though French communists at times allied with Hadj’s supporters during the 
1920s-1930s, relations deteriorated when the Communist Party (PCF) abandoned its support 
for Algerian independence.
36
 Hadj did have the support, though, of Trotskyists and leftist 
groups at times aligned with the SFIO, like the Gauche révolutionnaire faction led by 
Marceau Pivert and Jean Rous.
37
 This group, powerful in the Parisian Federation (Seine) and 
in the Socialist Youth movement, built personal ties with colonial movements that lasted into 
the 1950s.
38
  Evicted from the SFIO in 1936-37, most of them rejoined the SFIO after the 
Second World War. They and other supporters of colonial independence, like Édouard 
Depreux, Jean Longuet, and Zyromski, opposed armed insurrection, as would later socialist 
opponents of the Algerian War. However, a third option emerged as well. The Federation of 
Colonized Peoples, a coalition of leaders from French colonies referred to by James Genova 
as a “Colonial Popular Front,” promoted assimilation and self-determination for the colonies, 
which would then voluntarily join a federation with France on the model of the USA.
39
 It was 
to this model that postwar socialist leaders turned in hopes of preserving French empire after 
the Second World War. For the first time, concrete proposals for (con)federation with the 
colonies were on the table but, confusing matters but also opening new possibilities, so too 
were designs for European integration. 
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French Socialism and the “Federal Moment”: French Union and European Integration, 
1943-1954 
“We would not be socialists were we not patriots and internationalists,” Daniel Mayer said in 
November 1944 to a congress held to re-found the Socialist Party during the Allied liberation 
of France. Mayer, the leader of the socialist resistance, turned to a Belgian colleague at the 
congress to say that we “continue with pride to call [ourselves] the ‘French Section of the 
Workers International’.”
40
 The party, he said, “vows to recreat[e] and renew the Socialist 
Workers International, the existence of which is more necessary than ever” and to strive for a 
“League of Nations with a sovereignty superior to each of the national sovereignties.” As 
these comments suggest, the SFIO emerged in 1944-45 with its internationalist principles 
strengthened by a narrative that the failure of international solutions in the interwar period had 
led to economic collapse, nationalism, fascism, and a war more destructive than any that had 
preceded it. The party’s primary objectives would be reconstruction and establishing a lasting 
European peace. The 1944 congress resolution called for “a federation of free nations” with 
sovereign powers to ensure peaceful cooperation among the world powers, to create larger 
economic units, and “to permit the future integration of Germany, reformed in its structure 
and mentality, into the civilized community”. 
Language provides a window into deeper thinking and mentalities. “Civilized 
community” clearly meant the European community, as well as the United States and (though 
perhaps less so) the Soviet Union. Socialists spoke often in 1944-47 of “a Socialist United 
States of Europe as a step towards a United States of the World.”
41
 A “Third Force” Europe 
would bridge U.S. capitalism and Soviet communism and provide a means for peaceful 
cooperation between the superpowers. French colonies entered these discourses only at the 
periphery. They were a means to recover French national power necessary to achieve an 
internationalist vision.
42
 At the 1944 congress, future French president Vincent Auriol 
proposed “immediate negotiations with Belgium and Holland based on political interests and 
common national defense interests, as well as economic interests in Europe and in our 
overseas possessions” as a first step towards a “European federation.”
43
 When the Cold war 
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accelerated in 1948-1950, the SFIO came to support a more limited internationalist vision, a 
European community invested with sovereign powers over nation-states.  
Socialist internationalist discourses on European cooperation centered on the imperative 
of larger economic spaces and the perniciousness of national sovereignty. The principle was 
firm, internally consistent, and endlessly repeated. Party discourses and policies for French 
colonies, on the other hand, were confused, ambivalent, and divisive. Guy Mollet, a school 
teacher before the war who rose to lead the Pas-de-Calais federation in northern France, had 
no experience in colonial matters. He seems to have given the issue little thought before he 
replaced Mayer as general secretary in 1946. In his first prolonged statement on colonial 
policy, he surveyed the history of socialist thought going back to the nineteenth century. 
Regretting the “paucity of our documentary record,” he concluded that many socialists 
understandably “would find it hard to say what has been up to today the traditional position of 
socialism on the problems of French overseas territories, on colonial problems.”
44
 Setting out 
to clarify the party’s position, he resurrected the socialists’ prewar conception that colonial 
populations needed “an apprenticeship in political democracy” and that “colonial exploitation 
cannot be separated from the fight for the transformation of capitalist society.” There was 
some novelty in Mollet’s position, though. Earlier in the year, he rejected assimilation as a 
goal for emancipating colonial peoples, calling it “ridiculous” and a “joke” to think that they 
would one day “become conscious of their French nationality.”
45
 
Having cast assimilation aside, Mollet and his party rejected national independence as 
well. Mollet stitched together a vocabulary for emancipation that split the difference between 
assimilation and independence by “respect[ing] the ethnic and cultural personality [my 
emphasis] of diverse human groups.” Socialists, he said, should support an “association” or 
“federation” between France and its (former) colonies by “setting as the ultimate goal of our 
efforts the emancipation of indigenous populations, an emancipation that they will find in an 
ever closer union with a democratic and socialist France.” A “social emancipation” and an 
“economic emancipation” through investment, medical services, and schools would eradicate 
“misery, sickness, ignorance.” This rebranded colonizing mission was the SFIO’s contribution 
to the French provisional government’s debate on the constitutional framework of the French 
Union. A distinguishing feature of socialist colonial discourses in this period was the degree 
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to which the internationalist principle bled into socialist discussions of how to refashion the 
French empire into a French union.  
Mollet’s statement in 1947 that “our common effort for a collaboration or association 
[with the colonies] constitutes a step towards the world federation of peoples” lifted language 
directly from socialist internationalist discourses on European federation.
46
 Further, his 
assertion that the “grand reality of our time is an interdependence of interests and needs” 
grafted internationalist principles onto analyses of French empire. Colonial “separatism” took 
the place of European “nationalism” as a reactionary principle that “does not constitute a 
means for true liberation.” The integration of Germany into a wider community was necessary 
to prevent it from being devoured by the nationalist impulses of the victorious Allied powers; 
so too in the case of the colonies “the world cannot stand the dividing up of disarmed 
countries that risk falling prey to the large imperial powers.” The point here is not that the 
SFIO’s European and colonial policies were the same when Mollet and his party proposed 
European and colonial federations in 1946-47. Rather, Mollet rallied a party uncertain about 
the future of France’s colonies by evoking an internationalist discourse that united it. In 
applying the internationalist principle to the colonies, Mollet made it clear that the party’s 
position on nationalism and supranationalism applied both to Europe and to French overseas 
territories (and to French Algeria).  
Michael Collins identifies an international “post-1945 ‘federal moment’” in his analysis 
of decolonization in the British Empire.
47
 For Todd Shepard, European integration and French 
Union overlapped during an era of “great ensembles” after 1945, ending with Algerian 
independence in 1962. Though French socialists supported both federal projects, reforming 
the French empire was the first matter facing the provisional government, while uncertainties 
about the geopolitical situation delayed initiatives for European cooperation. Even before the 
war ended, the French consultative assembly held a conference in the Congolese city of 
Brazzaville to discuss the future of French empire. The conference followed a report by Pierre 
Olivier Lapie, a French socialist, who called for a federation between France and its “overseas 
territories,” the refashioned term for France’s colonies.
48
 In the end the conference proposed 
“emancipation through assimilation,” a federal assembly, and wide-ranging social and 
economic reforms. The conference resolution pointedly “discarded ‘self-government’” and 
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any prospect of independence. Socialists, in contrast, promoted association rather than 
assimilation, and local assemblies as a step towards autonomy within a federation.  
Colonial violence spiked at the end of the Second World War. A wave of terror against 
Muslims and murder by European Algerians followed a violent Muslim uprising in the town 
of Sétif, an uprising that broke out the same day the German government capitulated to the 
Allied powers in May 1945.
49
 The government also violently repressed a revolt in 
Madagascar, and began a nine-year war against a communist revolution for independence in 
Indochina. Nonetheless, historians have tended to overlook that French federation was a 
concept popular not only with French politicians eager to maintain a reformed version of 
French empire, but also with a large number of colonial representatives as well.
50
 The 
Overseas Independent parliamentary group, for instance, supported federation.
51
 Its leader, 
Léopold Sédar Senghor, the future president of Senegal, initially joined the Socialist Party 
before breaking to lead the new group in 1948.  At the 1946 SFIO congress, Senghor shared 
many of the socialist internationalist principles discussed in this article. He said that Vladimir 
“Lenin’s thesis” that national independence of colonial peoples was a step towards a world 
socialist revolution “is outdated.”
52
 The woes of the first independent black republic, Haiti, 
which was poor and de facto at the mercy of the United States, demonstrated that “in today’s 
reality, that is not independence, it is total dependence.” In his view, “the world is marching 
towards the creation of large zones of influence or, if you prefer a different expression, the 
creation of large federations.” 
To the disappointment of Senghor and the SFIO, the 1944-46 constitutional debates 
resulted in a weak and non-egalitarian French Union. After French voters rejected the first 
constitutional proposal in 1946, the revised version strengthened the position of European 
settlers in territorial assemblies and weakened the powers of the French Union, which was 
subordinated to the National Assembly and granted few formal powers. The postwar federal 
impetus then moved to Western European cooperation in the context of the Marshall Plan and 
The Hague summit. The SFIO and other proponents of European federation strongly 
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supported a supranational framework for the Organization of European Economic 
Cooperation and the Council of Europe, which began operation in 1948-49. However, British 
and Scandinavian governments refused to sacrifice national sovereignty. These organizations 
operated on the basis of unanimity, a fatal flaw for effective international governance in SFIO 
narratives of the failure of the League of Nations. In 1949, the term “European integration” 
surfaced to describe the ambitions of U.S. diplomats and their European allies for more 
powerful structures for European regional cooperation. Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet 
seized on this groundswell and channeled it in a direction they thought would ensure French 
“economic security” and permit French leaders a greater say in the development of the new 
West German state.
53
 The Schuman Plan of May 1950 was the product of internal French 
deliberations. The six-nation treaty that followed created the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the first supranational European community in modern history.   
French overseas territories were mostly an afterthought in the initial projects for 
European integration.
54
 Defining their relationship with the European communities became 
more pressing as initiatives proliferated in 1950-52 to extend supranational powers beyond 
the fields of coal and steel. A number of political groups in France supported French Union 
but less so European integration, viewing the two as potentially antagonistic. The SFIO 
supported both projects.
55
 In May 1949 a SFIO study group called for a “federation of Europe 
and of the Independent or associated Overseas States,” a call taken up six months later by the 
Socialist Movement for a United States of Europe, led by André Philip.
56
 Proposals for an 
association or federation between the French Union and the European communities 
complicated efforts to develop new forms of European integration, in particular during the 
interminable debates of an ad hoc European assembly formed to discuss a European Political 
Community (EPC).
57
 The EPC proposal intended to build democratic accountability for the 
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European Defense Community (EDC), a supranational project of military integration designed 
to rearm West Germany under European tutelage.  
In 1953-54, French Socialists were embroiled in a wrenching internal debate about 
whether to approve the EDC treaty signed in 1952. A split in the party eventually deprived the 
EDC of a majority in the National Assembly, which defeated the proposal in 1954. The SFIO 
leadership supported the project, but the SFIO right opposed it, in part due to widespread 
concerns that it would drive a wedge between France and its overseas territories. This group 
included prominent politicians like Robert Lacoste, Max Lejeune, and René Naegelen, who 
were shortly after among the most ardent defenders of French Algeria during the Algerian 
war. On the other hand, a left-leaning group emerged as well to oppose the EDC, including 
Daniel Mayer, Antoine Mazier, and Robert Verdier. They stressed the dangers a German 
military posed to West German democracy and held out hope for peaceful negotiations to 
reunite Germany and end the Cold War. Despite their opposition to the EDC, they strongly 
supported European integration. They were the most fervent socialist supporters of the 1954-
55 Radical-led government of Pierre Mendès-France, who oversaw international negotiations 
that ended the French war in Indochina as well as independence for the French protectorates 
of Morocco and Tunisia, in addition to presiding over the EDC’s defeat.
58
 In a sign of things 
to come, the anti-EDC socialist left began to converge with anticolonial groups outside of the 
party, many of which did not share their support for European integration or their view that 
national sovereignties were dangerous and obsolete.   
 
Independence and Interdependence: French Socialism, European Economic Community, and 
the Algerian War, 1955-58 
 
The Indochina war of 1946-1954 destabilized French governments, damaged France’s moral 
and geopolitical prestige, and divided the Socialist Party. Internal conflicts foreshadowed the 
struggle that broke out among socialists during the Algerian war.
59
 In 1947, Mollet evoked 
socialist internationalist rhetoric against “abandoning France’s position in Indochina,” arguing 
that “this so-called independence would halt the movement towards social emancipation in 
Indochina…”
60
 An anti-colonialist wing in the party around Jean Rous and the Socialist 
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Youth section angrily denounced the SFIO’s involvement in the war, but they were soon 
expelled from the party.
61
 More moderate SFIO parliamentarians like Mazier regretted that 
party resolutions advocating a negotiated peace went unheeded while Alain Savary worked 
tirelessly for a ceasefire to prepare a French withdrawal, traveling numerous times to 
Indochina to meet Vietminh officials.
62
 At the same time, there were bitter recriminations 
against Naegelen, Socialist Governor General in Algeria, who arrested leaders of Hadj’s 
nationalist party, banned its newspaper and, when it was nonetheless on the verge of an 
electoral victory in 1948, rigged the election.
63
 Naegelen justified his actions to the SFIO 
parliamentary group thusly, “One does not give liberty to people by giving them the vote, but 
rather by pulling them out of ignorance, and saving them from sickness, hunger and thirst.”
64
  
At the 1949 SFIO congress, Oreste Rosenfeld, socialist deputy in the assembly of the 
French Union, revealed the quandary colonial independence movements posed to French 
socialist internationalism: 
…a whole world [is] on the march. Are we going to remain in the colonialist 
camp, or are we going to lead this movement and give the populations of the 
French Union the chance to develop themselves instead of seeking liberty in an 
ephemeral independence, which a small country can no longer maintain today, 
at the moment when we feel that France can no longer survive alone in Europe 
and that it is necessary to create a European Union? At this moment, are we 
going to push colonial peoples towards independence, which they will seek if 
they do not feel like they can reach an agreement [s’entendre] with France?
65
 
This remark merits attention because Rosenfeld was the first prominent SFIO official to 
denounce the Algerian war and among the first expelled from the party for his vocal 
opposition. Historians have emphasized the role of André Philip, who moved from supporting 
the socialist government to leading the socialist minority in accusing Mollet of “betray[ing] 
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 Like Rosenfeld, Philip at first thought that “We must make our friends 
understand that total independence is no longer possible for any people, we are 
interdependent, and the former colonies…should join a regional economic group, most often 
the European group.”
67
 Rosenfeld and Philip, later renowned critics of the Algerian war, 
supported the socialist internationalist principle for Europe and, it bears repeating, considered 
it applicable to overseas France and Algeria as well.
68
 Though Philip supported the EDC and 
Rosenfeld did not, they united behind the European “relaunch” of 1955 that began 
negotiations for a European common market and atomic energy community. When the 
Socialist-led government evoked the party’s internationalist doctrine in 1956-57 to justify its 
conduct in Algeria, however, it provoked a wrenching re-evaluation of the principle’s 
geographic boundaries.  
A world was indeed on the march. In the early 1950s, two French neologisms surfaced, 
the “Third World” (Tiers-Monde) and decolonization, to describe national independence 
movements and the emergence of postcolonial states.
69
 When the Front de Libération 
Nationale (FLN) began its revolution for Algerian independence in November 1954, it 
brought this struggle to the French republic itself (Algeria was a department of France, not an 
“overseas territory”). The FLN challenged French republicanism in a far more vivid way than 
had the distant war in Indochina and, to the SFIO’s frustration, the Asian Socialist 
Conference, a grouping of political parties from Asia and the Middle East, immediately 
backed the FLN.
70
 Algerian nationalists rode a Third Worldist wave that encouraged 
solidarity between colonized and formally colonized peoples. This new internationalism 
directly contested the SFIO’s doctrine that national sovereignties were obsolete and asserted 
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instead that national independence was a precondition for international cooperation, rather 
than its impediment.  
Mollet responded to the FLN in 1955 that “secession…would be a catastrophe for the 
people of overseas France who simply cannot develop their own economic resources.”
71
 
Philip shared this view, stating that “Algeria is incapable of assuring its own existence.”
72
 In 
September, Mollet wrote, “No pseudo-independence at a moment when every day affirms the 
advantage of the interdependence of peoples and nations.”
73
 The next month, he laid out the 
SFIO’s ambiguous policy for Algeria to the SFIO parliamentary group: “We should orient 
individuals and people towards independence but not towards sovereignty.”
74
 The phrasing 
borrowed directly from the party’s European discourse, which argued that European 
integration was a means rather than obstacle to French independence. The nearly unanimous 
resolution of the July 1955 SFIO congress called for a new association agreement with 
overseas territories, a reformed Algerian assembly composed half of European and half of 
Muslim representatives (Muslims, though, were 90% of the population), and a vast program 
of economic and social development. 
When French men and women went to the polls in December 1955, most of those 
supporting the SFIO and the center-left Republican Front electoral alliance thought that they 
were voting for peace in Algeria.
75
 A Movement for Overseas Justice and Liberty, in which 
Rous, Pivert, and Rosenfeld participated, called for “recognition of the existence of the 
Algerian nation.” The SFIO’s central newspaper published the group’s announcement.
76
 
Mollet spoke of “this stupid war without end,” and the party opposed the government’s 
decision to send additional soldiers to Algeria.
77
 Nonetheless, Evans describes Mollet’s 
rhetoric on Algeria as “vague and ambiguous.”
78
 In his last speech before the election, Mollet 
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presented peace as a restoration of security and an amplification of the social and economic 
reform program begun by Mendès-France, whom Mollet expected to lead the next 
government. Power landed, however, in the hands of the Socialist Party because its pro-
European orientation facilitated the building of a stable parliamentary majority. When Mollet 
formed a cabinet in January 1956, a French government was in place that, for the first time, 
was determined to simultaneously pursue European integration and federation for overseas 
France. 
The Socialist-led government, elected on a peace platform, instead oversaw an 
escalation of violence that immersed Algeria in full-fledged war. Mollet’s first move was to 
appoint Georges Catroux, known as a liberal, Governor General of Algeria. When Mollet 
visited Algeria in February, the capitol city Algiers degenerated into turmoil. Settlers pelted 
Mollet with tomatoes and clashed with police. What struck Mollet most was the protestors’ 
humble appearance; they looked like the proletariat his party claimed to represent.
79
 Mollet 
quickly accepted Catroux’s resignation. Returning to Paris, he insisted that he had not 
capitulated to protestors and that government policy had not changed.
80
 He announced the 
famous “triptych”: ceasefire, free elections in Algeria and, only then, negotiations with the 
elected representatives for a new association or federation with France. Independence though, 
was non-negotiable. Mollet sent Lacoste, a hardliner, to govern Algeria. The National 
Assembly, with communist votes, declared martial law in Algeria and granted Lacoste special 
powers that he promised to use to repress the ultras of the Muslim and European 
communities. The scale of violence grew and, in June, Mollet called up reserves and doubled 
the French military presence in Algeria. Socialist Army Minister Max Lejeune pressured his 
generals for progress at all costs while Lacoste protected ruthless parachutiste contingents 
from scrutiny by the French judiciary.
81
 The military burned down villages, practiced 
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systematic torture, set up internment camps, and carried out summary executions.
82
 When the 
FLN began a wave of terrorism in Algiers in January 1957, Lacoste granted full powers to 
General Jacques Massu, in effect marking the end of civilian rule in Algeria.
83
  
As the war continued and the military’s draconian tactics intensified, unrest spread 
within the Socialist Party.
84
 For the first five months of 1956, the massive program of 
economic and social reforms announced by the government and Lacoste’s promise to liberate 
Muslims from colonialism kept protests in check.
85
 Internal critics held out hope that this 
“extension of political rights and economic assistance unparalleled in the history of western 
overseas imperialism,” in the words of one historian, might bear fruit.
86
 Doctors and social 
workers spread through Algeria, extending free medical care and old-age insurance to 
Muslims. Decrees favored Muslim candidates for the civil service, dramatically increased 
wages for Muslim workers, and financed a massive school-building program that 
accompanied renewed efforts to matriculate Muslim students. A modernization program was 
launched to industrialize Algeria, lift living standards, and redistribute agricultural land.
87
 
Socialists opposed to state violence in Algeria, for their part, did not have a compelling 
alternative to offer. They too abhorred the brutal methods of the FLN, which included 
amputations, massacres, and body desecration. Further, they opposed Algerian independence, 
agreed with SFIO leaders that national independence was illusory in the modern world, and 
thought that Algerian economic modernization was impossible without French assistance. 
Events in October 1956, though, provoked a minority faction to break with the 
government. Without cabinet approval, Lejeune ordered the first airline hijacking in history to 
capture the FLN leadership en route to Morocco.
88
 The spectacular seizure put an end to five 
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months of secret talks between the FLN and French socialist representatives attempting to 
prepare the grounds for a ceasefire.
89
 Then Mollet’s government embarked on a daring 
foreign “adventure” one week later: a British-French-Israeli assault on Gamal Abdar Nasser’s 
Egypt which came to be known as the Suez War. Nasser had recently nationalized the Suez 
Canal, sheltered Algerian revolutionaries, and provided arms to the FLN. Socialist leaders 
compared Nasser’s pan-Islamism to national socialist expansionism under Adolf Hitler, 
subsuming French enemies in Africa within an all-encompassing anti-nationalist rhetoric 
(overlooking what many observers considered to be a nationalist reflex occurring within 
France).
90
 The Suez War incited leaders of newly independent states into a vigorous defense 
of Nasser. Mollet’s actions deeply embarrassed European colleagues in the Socialist 




As the SFIO began to splinter in fall 1956, Mollet and his allies mobilized “European” 
discourses to defend French Algeria and discredit socialist critics, insisting on the universality 
of their internationalist principles. Negotiations for a European common market and an atomic 
energy community achieved a series of breakthroughs from October 1956 to February 1957, 
resulting in the Treaties of Rome to create the EEC. At the last moment, Mollet injected 
overseas France into the negotiations, extracting promises of European development aid for 
French Africa to assist French finances depleted by war and domestic expenses.
92
 In January 
1957, Mollet gave his most comprehensive speech on the French Union, in which he argued 
that Algeria would have infinitely greater economic possibilities within a Eurafrican 
community than as an independent state. Without European assistance, Algeria would be 
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“doomed to anarchy and social repression.”
93
 Inverting an earlier socialist view that Africa 
could reconcile France and Germany, Mollet called on Europe and on West Germany in 
particular to rescue French Africa.
94
 Mollet argued that without the EEC’s commitment “the 
disaffection of the overseas population” would explode because “we will not be capable of 
bringing the aid that they expect.”
95
 The Treaties of Rome targeted investment towards 
French sub-Saharan Africa and avoided a direct European entanglement in the Algerian War. 
Nonetheless, Mollet was quick to exploit his success in advancing European integration, an 
objective that united the party, to buttress his position on Algeria.  
Flush with their European success, SFIO officials pummeled internal opponents with 
socialist international discourses. Christian Pineau, the SFIO foreign minister who oversaw 
the EEC negotiations, insisted that socialists cease “this error of opposing the word 
‘colonialism’ to the word ‘independence’”. “Don’t you see,” he said, “that we, Westerners, 
after our experiences of independence in the nineteenth century…are moving not towards 
independence of different nations in the world…but rather towards formulas of 
interdependence, towards formulas of abandoning sovereignty…”
96
 Gérard Jaquet, probably 
the party’s foremost enthusiast for European integration, argued that, “this independence will 
be illusory…What does independence mean in our epoch of great states? What would the 
independence of a state with 10 million inhabitants [Algeria] mean?” In 1957, he proclaimed 
that “independence…will be a profound error…at the hour of great nations, when small 
territories will be condemned to a miserable life…”
97
  Mollet charged his critics with leading 
the party into an “impossible paradox”: “The more our people advance…the more they 
become conscious that sovereignty must disappear…that the time of borders has passed, that 
supranational organization must be created, that the hour of European organization has arrived 
as we await a larger Europe and a more united world, the more they think that it would be a 
                                                          
93
 Evans, Algeria, 195. 
94
 This phrasing is a play on the title of Alan Milward’s book on the origins of European 
integration. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State.  
95
 Paris, OURS, AGM 70, Déclaration de M. Guy MOLLET, Président du Conseil, pour le 
numéro spécial du journal “DEMAIN” consacré au MARCHE COMMUN EUROPEEN, 27 
mars 1957. 
96
 Paris, OURS, Conseil national Puteaux, 15 et 16 décembre 1956. 
97
 Paris, OURS, 49ème congrès national Toulouse, 27 au 30 juin 1957. 
24 
 
progress to divide that which is united, to create borders where there are no nations, where 
they have never existed[?] That,” he concluded, “is inconceivable.” 
 
Competing Internationalisms: Third Worldism, ‘68ers, and the Re-Founding of the Socialist 
Party  
 
As the Algerian war morphed into the most severe crisis of postwar French history, socialist 
internationalist principles came under assault such that, by the early 1960s, two 
internationalist ideologies were fighting for the soul of French socialism. Radicals supporting 
Third World state-building and revolution contested an older socialist vision of European 
integration and supranationalism. A series of conflicts beginning with the Algerian war and 
culminating with the U.S. war in Vietnam provided fodder for a new meta-narrative that 
transformed “anti-colonialism” into “anti-imperialism,” setting the stage for the 
internationalist rhetoric of the ’68 movement.
98
 In 1955-57 Mollet transposed socialist 
internationalist principles from Europe to Algeria, narrating French colonialism out of history 
by hitching a reformed transcontinental French federation onto Europe’s progressive march 
towards ever closer union. He was not the only French socialist to think this way but the 
results were most disastrous under his watch. As a result, French socialist internationalism 
became one of many casualties of the Algerian War. Mollet’s policy for Algeria split 
proponents of European integration into different parties and helped bring about the Fifth 
Republic, in which the SFIO had to adapt to a transformed political context. Not only did 
French socialists find themselves forced to compromise with parties on the left that had 
opposed supranationalism in the 1950s, but they also faced increasingly assertive Third 




 Opposition to the Algerian war provided meaning, purpose, and direction to the “New 
Left,” which blossomed into an influential intellectual and cultural movement that rejected 
both the Socialist and Communist parties.
100
 The war made the far left, long dormant, 
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suddenly relevant again, spurred the first mass student protests of the 1960s, and opened 
doors for cooperation between left-wing Christians and a previously hostile socialist 
movement. The FLN’s campaign to “internationalize” the war captivated the attention of a 
global public.
101
 For the “New Left,” the Algerian war epitomized Western intervention in the 
Third World. It was a “dirty” war in both method and intent. The “New Left” set socialist 
internationalism on its head, idealizing non-European revolutionaries, like Frantz Fanon in 
Algeria, Che Guevara in Latin America, and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and celebrated their 
violence. The French New Left was part of a global movement in the 1960s that shifted its 
gaze from revolution in Europe to revolution abroad, transposed the role of vanguard from the 
European working classes to people of color overseas, and re-defined internationalism as 
solidarity with the Third World. European unity no longer sat on the altar of progress, giving 




At the forefront of these developments in France was a new socialist party, the Parti 
Socialiste Unifié (PSU). Formed in 1960, the PSU was a fusion of a left-Catholic party 
(Union des gauches socialistes), an unorthodox communist party (Le Tribune Communiste), 
and a socialist party that split from the SFIO in 1958 (the Parti Socialiste Autonome, PSA).
103
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The PSU brought together anti-colonial leftists like Yvan Craipeau and Laurent Schwartz, 
journalists Claude Bourdet and Gilles Martinet of the newspaper France-Observateur, 
Mendès-France and his supporters, and dissident socialists, most prominently Mayer, 
Rosenfeld, Savary, and Verdier. Depreux served as the party’s general secretary from 1960 to 
1967. The PSU was a young, educated, middle-class party with fewer industrial workers than 
the SFIO but far higher proportions of women, students and Christians. When radicals won 
control in 1960 of the national student organization, the Union des étudiants de France 
(UNEF), they launched, with the support of the PSU, the first mass demonstration for peace in 
Algeria.
104
 Although the PSU’s share of the vote remained meager, it had a cultural and 
political impact disproportionate to its size. It nurtured in its ranks an ethos that came to 
define the “spirit of ‘68’” in France, helped foster new social movements like feminism, 
ecology, gay and immigrant rights, and provided personnel and ideas that shaped the Socialist 
Party (Parti socialiste) that replaced the SFIO in 1969-1972.
105
 
The PSU rejected Mollet’s application of socialist internationalist principles to Algeria. 
At the same time the PSU remained, as Daniel Gordon writes, “by temperament a deeply 
internationalist party…,” an outlook that the party’s founding generation of socialist 
dissidents brought with them when they migrated from the SFIO to the PSA/PSU in 1958-
1960.
106
 As the 1960s progressed, however, the PSU discarded the very principle of socialist 
internationalism as it had evolved since the First World War. Historians of French socialism 
write that “anti-colonialism and opposition to the Algerian War served as cement” for the 
party.
107
 Yet there were cracks in this cement. Former SFIO dissidents in the PSU accepted 
Algerian independence reluctantly as the best of a bad set of options. They detested Mollet 
and wanted peace in Algeria, but they did not support the FLN, a movement that radicals 
lionized. Like SFIO leaders, Depreux and his former SFIO colleagues were convinced that 
national independence would bring all sorts of problems to Algeria.
108
 At first, they hoped 
that an independent Algeria would choose to join a supranational federation or confederation 
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 Their radical, often younger, party comrades, on the other hand, championed 
Third World nationalism. The internal divide in the PSU came passionately to the fore in a 
1961 row over whether to support desertion in the French military and ally with the FLN, for 
instance by engaging in illegal activities like serving as porteurs de valises (“suitcase carriers” 
who clandestinely transported money, false papers, and other contraband for the FLN).
110
  
Further, Mayer, Philip, and Rosenfeld carried “modernization theory” into the PSU, 
arguing that development assistance to newly independent states was the best means of 
showing solidarity with formerly colonized peoples and alleviating the gap between the 
“developed” and “undeveloped” world. Like the SFIO, they advocated supranational 
institutions to direct this aid, evidence of the continued potency of socialist internationalist 
thought, and they supported the EEC’s association agreements with African states.
111
 PSU 
radicals, on the other hand, adopted dependency theory, a concept developed in Latin 
America that argued that the hegemonic position of highly industrialized capitalist states was 
responsible for permanent economic stagnation in the Third World. International institutions 
sponsored by Western states and development assistance were, in these analyses, neo-colonial 
endeavors that undermined national economic programs for industrialization and economic 
transformation.  
The Algerian War set new fault-lines on the French left that lasted through the 1960s. 
The SFIO majority backed the creation of Charles de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic in 1958 and 
followed Mollet’s view that “If we have any chance in France…to find a political solution for 
the Algerian problem…it is in supporting the positions that de Gaulle takes on this problem, 
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because they are our positions.”
112
 The SFIO’s Algerian policy evolved with de Gaulle: the 
party advocated new designs for Franco-Algerian federations before acceding to Algerian 
self-determination and independence following the 1962 Evian accords between the FLN and 
the French government (and independence for West Africa in 1960-62 as well). Socialists 
who joined the PSA/PSU, however, rejected the Fifth Republic in 1958 and argued for 
immediate Algerian independence. Though they were bitterly divided on Algeria, the SFIO 
and PSA/PSU decried de Gaulle’s opposition to supranationalism within the EEC and called 
for greater progress towards integrating Europe.  
Mollet’s Algerian policy undermined French socialist internationalism by fracturing its 
adherents into opposing camps. Socialists were drawn into new alliances with groups that did 
not share the tradition of socialist internationalism as understood and practiced by the SFIO 
during the Fourth Republic. Socialists in the PSU found themselves defending European 
integration against radical critics who derided the EEC as just another embodiment of the 
bipolar Cold War world that they were trying to overthrow, an “imperialist” organization 
ancillary to NATO.
113
 This was not at all what Depreux, Mayer, Savary and others had had in 
mind when they left the SFIO. Though at times critical of the path European integration had 
taken, they supported the EEC and the goal of a united Europe. They were uncomfortable to 
discover that their conception of internationalism in Europe did not resonate with young 
radicals. In 1958, the PSA unsuccessfully applied to join the Socialist International.
114
 By 
1968, when a massive student movement set up barricades in Paris, the PSU had moved so far 
left that the idea of allying with the moderate parties of the SI was no longer even 
conceivable. The PSU was the only major party in France to fully embrace the ’68 
movements and to join protests in the streets.
115
 As the party marched to the left, one by one 
former SFIO dissidents left the PSU and a number of them, for instance Verdier and Savary, 
rejoined the SFIO.  
Supranationalism, European integration, and allegiance to the SI, all doctrines long 
sacred for French socialists, increasingly took a back seat to other concerns in the SFIO as 
well. Mollet’s Algerian policies led to conflicts with other European socialist parties, in 
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particular with the British Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democratic Party.
116
 As Wall 
argues, Mollet’s unilateralism in Algeria arguably prepared the grounds for de Gaulle’s 
foreign policy of grandeur, which glorified French independent action on the world stage 
(though Mollet and his party refused to recognize their illegitimate offspring). Despite their 
questionable legacy in government, SFIO leaders carried the party’s internationalist principles 
into the 1960s. In 1967, Pineau denounced de Gaulle for not recognizing that “Europe is the 
only real means of independence.” Jaquet said that “The condition for independence is…the 
construction of a great European community.”
117
 The party favored increased powers for the 
European Commission, the EEC’s supranational executive, direct elections for the European 
Parliament, larger transfers of sovereignty from the member-states to the European 
communities, and enlargement to new member-states. Its goals were a European political 
federation and supranational economic planning.
118
 
At the same time, SFIO leaders were building alliances with parties that did not share 
their enthusiasm for supranationalism and European integration. The constitution of the Fifth 
Republic was a presidential regime with (after a 1962 referendum) a popularly elected 
president. This new system rewarded large electoral coalitions, which prompted SFIO leaders 
to ponder how to construct an alternative majority to the Gaullist center-right. A 1965 SFIO 
congress obstructed a proposed alliance with the MRP, a French Christian democratic party in 
decline that favored European integration. Instead, the party sought alliances with secular 
parties and with left-wing clubs. The result was a loose party confederation, the Fédération 
démocratique des gauches socialistes (FGDS), which supported François Mitterrand’s 
presidential candidacy in 1965. These new allies were often lukewarm or antagonistic towards 
European integration: many members of the Radical Party opposed supranationalism in the 
1950s and the clubs tended towards Third Worldism. Most spectacularly, a few years earlier 
Mollet had turned to the Communist Party for support in legislative elections, marking a sea-
change in French politics. For the next twenty years, socialists and communists worked for a 
strategic rapprochement. European integration divided the parties, forcing each to 
compromise. In 1968, the FGDS and the PCF reached an agreement in which the Communist 
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Party recognized the “reality” of the European communities and the FGDS the “capitalist 
nature” of the EEC.
119
  
These engagements prepared the ground for a profound process of renewal and re-
composition of the French Socialist Party that reduced and transformed the internationalist 
doctrine. The party congress finally overthrew Mollet in 1969 after twenty-three years of 
leadership, handing the party to Savary, before passing the reigns to Mitterrand in 1971. No 
piece of the socialist internationalist tradition emerged unscathed. The party adopted a new 
name, the Parti Socialiste (PS), abandoning any pretense of belonging to a higher 
international socialist authority. To the astonishment of the old guard, the founding resolution 
of the new party at first did not even mention the SI.
120
 Only after Verdier intervened did the 
PS reaffirm its SI membership, though even this proved controversial.
121
 Support for Third 
Worldism (for instance, Palestinian liberation) had made inroads in previous years as well, 
while older socialists, like Pineau, rejected its basic tenet, stating that “The creation of Israel 
has nothing do with the war France once conducted in Indochina, and Nasser and Mao Tse 
Tung have nothing in common besides propaganda.”
122
 Moreover, skepticism towards 
European integration had grown among the party’s younger generation. Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement, who had been a soldier during the Algerian War, rose in prominence by 
combining calls for “solidarity with the Third World” with a socialism that prioritized the 
nation-state over the European communities.
123
  
At a 1970 socialist congress old and new conceptions of socialism and European 
integration clashed in the open. Chevènement defended a motion stating that “if participation 
in Europe becomes an obstacle to the development of Socialism in France, Socialists will in 
this case give priority to Socialism over Europe.” Older socialists were incredulous at this 
“retreat” from the internationalist principle, which to their minds was synonymous with 
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socialism itself, and accused their opponents of embracing communist ideas.
124
 The party’s 
foreign secretary, Robert Pontillon, rejected this “false choice that is submitted to us between 
Socialism and capitalist Europe.” Mollet, for his part, said that “one cannot build socialism in 
one country,” and “I do not choose between Socialism and Europe.” Against the wishes of 
Mollet and his allies, the congress approved a resolution that read, “If one day the 
development of European construction breaks the evolution towards Socialism, the Socialist 
Party will not renounce privileging Socialist solutions.”
125
 European integration and 




The PS of the 1970s was a less internationalist-oriented party that looked to the nation-state to 
solve economic and social problems. Mitterrand, socialist leader after 1971, reversed himself 
in 1970 and defended the national veto established by de Gaulle within the European 
communities. Michel Rocard, a future socialist prime minister, became PSU secretary general 
in 1967, replacing Depreux’s pro-integration leadership. He left the PSU in 1973 to join the 
PS and, that same year, co-authored an anti-EEC pamphlet, “The Common Market against 
Europe.”
126
 Socialist policy oscillated on supranationalism and European institutions in the 
1970s. In alliance with the Communist Party, the PS won the 1981 elections. After President 
Mitterrand attempted to implement his electoral platform of sweeping nationalizations to 
move France towards socialism while remaining within the EEC, a frenzy of capital flight 
forced a change of course. Mitterrand responded by pivoting to Europe, advocating initiatives 
that led to the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 that created the 
EU. To many the experience of Mitterrand’s government seemed to vindicate the SFIO’s 
view that socialism was only possible at a level greater than the nation-state. Others, however, 
blamed the European communities and international economic structures for the fate of this 
last attempt to build socialism in France. For fifty years now, Chevènement and others have 
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demanded that French governments claw sovereignty back from European institutions in 
Brussels.  
The decolonization of French socialism in the 1960s should be considered part of the 
history of “decolonized France,” a term offered by Christoph Kalter and Martin Rempe to 
argue that decolonization occurred not only in the (former) colonies, but in France as well.
127
 
A marginalization of socialist internationalism was part of the “remaking of France” during 
the “invention of decolonization,” to employ analytical categories presented by Todd 
Shepard.
128
 In the decolonization of French socialism, the SFIO’s form of internationalism 
declined and Third Worldism ascended, for a time. A “generation of the Algerian War” rose 
to displace the “postwar generation” of socialist leaders though, ironic in a way, their leader 
was Mitterrand, who had long hushed up his own involvement in the war.
129
 At the 1973 
Socialist congress, only a quarter of delegates under thirty considered European integration 
“very important,” a figure that rose above sixty percent among the party’s oldest 
generation.
130
 The PS was skeptical of European integration in a way hardly imaginable in the 
SFIO. Yet disappointment with the Third World was manifest by the early 1970s as well, due 
to seemingly endemic corruption, dictatorship, and war.
131
 As the conflict between two 
internationalisms wound down in the mid-1970s, internationalism largely vanished as a 
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